Exploring the hardship of ease: Subjective and objective effort in the ease-of-processing paradigm by unknown
ORIGINAL PAPER
Exploring the hardship of ease: Subjective and objective effort
in the ease-of-processing paradigm
Bettina von Helversen Æ Guido H. E. Gendolla Æ
Piotr Winkielman Æ Ralph E. Schmidt
Published online: 20 March 2008
 The Author(s) 2008
Abstract Numerous studies examined the role of pro-
cessing effort in judgments using the ‘‘ease-of-processing’’
paradigm in which participants generate or retrieve few or
many issue-relevant thoughts. Because earlier studies only
assessed the subjective effort, it is unclear if this paradigm
also mobilizes objective effort, and how such effort relates
to subjective effort. These questions were addressed in two
experiments modeled on standard tasks from the processing
effort literature: ‘‘ease of argument generation’’ (Study 1)
and ‘‘ease of retrieval’’ (Study 2). In both experiments we
simultaneously measured subjective effort (via self-report)
and objective effort (via cardiovascular reactivity). The
results showed that processing ease manipulations (gener-
ation or retrieval of few vs. many exemplars) influence not
only subjective effort, but also objective effort, as reflected
especially by increases of systolic blood pressure in the
many exemplars condition. However, only subjective effort
was related to judgment. In the discussion, we consider the
role of various forms of effort and other relevant variables
in ‘‘processing ease’’ effects.
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Introduction
There is increasing evidence that cognitive experiences
influence judgment and behavior (Schwarz 1998).
Examples of cognitive experiences include feelings of
familiarity (Jacoby et al. 1989; Fazendeiro et al. 2005),
boredom (Csikszentmihalyi 1975), or surprise (Gendolla
and Koller 2001). Much research in this area examines
how attitudes and judgments are influenced by experi-
ences related to mental processing effort (see Schwarz
and Clore 2006, for a review). In the present research we
focus on the ‘‘accessibility experience’’ (see Schwarz
1998), which refers to a broad sense of effort in a cog-
nitive task and is typically investigated with paradigms
that involve retrieval or generation of a large amount of
information.
Most research on ‘‘accessibility experiences’’ has relied
on self-reports of subjectively experienced effort—usually
assessed as ratings of task difficulty—and ignored the
objective effort invested. This has left several questions
unaddressed. First, is effort only subjectively experienced
or also objectively mobilized in the ease-of-processing
paradigm? Second, if objective effort is mobilized, how
does it relate to subjective effort? Finally, how does sub-
jective and objective effort relate to the standard
judgmental effects of processing ease manipulations? In
the present research we address these questions by simul-
taneously investigating the role of subjective and objective
effort in the ‘‘ease-of-retrieval’’ and the ‘‘ease-of-argu-
ment-generation’’ paradigms. Our current studies build on
earlier findings that objective effort can be accurately
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assessed with psychophysiological means (see Gendolla
and Brinkmann 2005; Wright and Kirby 2001 for reviews).
Ease effects on judgments
The idea that processing effort influences judgments goes
back to the notion of the availability heuristic, which proposes
that people estimate event frequency and probability ‘‘by the
ease with which instances or associations come to mind’’
(Tversky and Kahneman 1973, p. 208). However, initial
experimental tests of the availability heuristic did not distin-
guish whether judgments are primarily based on the amount of
accessible information (i.e., retrieval content) or the experi-
ence of accessibility (i.e., retrieval effort). To address these
issues, Schwarz and colleagues (1991) designed a very
influential ‘‘few-many’’ paradigm (traditionally referred to as
‘‘ease-of-processing’’ paradigm) which pits the amount of
accessible information against the subjective effort of
retrieving that information. In this paradigm, some partici-
pants retrieve or generate many thoughts, which results in
more accessible information, but also higher subjective dif-
ficulty. Other participants retrieve or generate few thoughts,
which results in less accessible information, but also lower
difficulty. Interestingly, the results suggest that retrieval effort
can override the amount of retrieved information. For exam-
ple, in one study participants who recalled 12 assertive
behaviors later rated themselves as less assertive than did
participants who had recalled only 6 assertive behaviors. This
paradoxical effect presumably occurs because the difficulty of
recalling 12 assertive behaviors indicates to participants that
they cannot be very assertive. Since then numerous studies
with the ease-of-processing paradigm have shown parallel
effects in domains as diverse as quality of one’s own child-
hood memory (Winkielman et al. 1998), behavioral
frequencies (Aarts and Dijksterhuis 1999), happiness
(Winkielman and Schwarz 2001), health risks (Rothman and
Schwarz 1998), commercial products (Wa¨nke et al. 1997), and
attitude formation (Wa¨nke et al. 1996).
Subjective and objective effort
As stated earlier, the role of objectively mobilized effort in the
ease-of-processing paradigm is unclear as this issue has never
been investigated. Assessing subjectively experienced and
objectively mobilized effort simultaneously allows testing
three possible hypotheses concerning the role of objective
effort: (1) There is no objective effort involved in the ease-of-
processing paradigm; (2) objective effort is mobilized, but
judgment effects are primarily driven by subjective effort; and
(3) objective effort is mobilized and plays a critical role in the
judgment effects.
To test these possibilities, actually mobilized effort must
be assessed by other means than by self-reports. In general,
individuals have trouble accurately reporting on their inter-
nal states (Nisbett and Wilson 1977; Silvia and Gendolla
2001), including effort (Morsella 2005). Self-reports can
also be systematically biased due to communicative issues
(Schwarz 1999) and self-presentational concerns (Py-
szczynski and Greenberg 1987). More specifically, in the
multi-item ease paradigm, the ratings of effort could reflect
several variables other than actual effort. For example, after
generating or retrieving many as opposed to few items (e.g.,
12 vs. 4), participants could rate the task as hard because they
performed more cognitive steps, came closer to running out
of relevant recall content, or took more time than expected.
In short, when asked about ‘‘effort’’, participants in the many
event condition may self-report greater difficulty without
actually having to mobilize more resources than do partici-
pants in the few events condition.
Measuring effort mobilization objectively
There is ample evidence that cardiovascular reactivity—
i.e., the changes in the activity of the heart and the vas-
culature in the context of task performance—is a very
adequate operationalization of objective task engagement
or effort mobilization. According to Wright’s (1996) inte-
gration of motivational intensity theory (Brehm et al. 1983;
Brehm and Self 1989) with Obrist’s (1981) ‘‘active cop-
ing’’ approach to cardiovascular arousal, the impact of the
sympathetic nervous system on the heart and the vascula-
ture is proportional to the actual level of subjective task
difficulty, as long as success is possible and worthwhile.
These cardiovascular effects are independent of metabolic
demand and can be observed in cognitive tasks involving
mental effort (e.g., in attention or memory tasks; see
Gendolla and Brinkmann 2005; Wright and Kirby 2001 for
reviews).
Among common indices of cardiovascular activity,
systolic blood pressure (SBP) responds most sensitively to
task demand (e.g., Gendolla and Kru¨sken 2002; Gerin et al.
1995; Light 1981; Obrist et al. 1974; Obrist 1981; Sher-
wood et al. 1990; Smith et al. 2000; Wright et al. 2003).
This is because, besides vascular resistance, systolic pres-
sure depends on the contractility of the heart muscle.
Contractility is determined by b-adrenergic sympathetic
discharge to the heart (Brownley et al. 2000), which sys-
tematically responds to the experienced difficulty to
perform a task (Obrist 1981; Wright 1996). The task-rela-
ted adjustments of diastolic blood pressure (DBP) and heart
rate (HR) are less systematic. DBP depends on vascular
resistance, which is unsystematically affected by sympa-
thetic arousal. HR is determined by both sympathetic and
parasympathetic arousal and thus only responds to effort
mobilization to the extent to which the sympathetic impact
is stronger (e.g., Berntson et al. 1993; Obrist 1981).
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The present research
Two experiments investigated the role of subjective and
objective effort in standard ease-of-processing para-
digms—ease-of-argument-generation (Experiment 1) and
ease-of-retrieval (Experiment 2). Our goals were (1) to
measure the objectively mobilized and subjectively expe-
rienced effort, and (2) to examine how these variables
contribute to ease-of-processing effects on resulting atti-
tudes and judgments.
Experiment 1: Ease-of-argument generation
This experiment investigated the influence of effort
involved in argument generation on attitudes using a
procedure based on Wa¨nke et al. (1996). Participants first
generated few (easy condition) or many (difficult con-
dition) arguments in favor of public transportation.
Subsequently, we measured attitudes towards the public
transport system. Based on previous research, we pre-
dicted more negative attitudes towards public
transportation in the difficult condition. In addition to the
subjective effort of argument generation, this experiment
included measures of objectively mobilized effort in
terms of cardiovascular reactivity. We predicted that
participants in the difficult condition would experience
higher subjective effort (Schwarz 1998) and mobilize
more objective effort in terms of cardiovascular reac-
tivity (Wright and Kirby 2001).
Method
Participants and design
Twenty university students (average age 23.45 years,
SD = 3.35) with various majors (psychology excluded,
because of prior knowledge about similar tasks) were
randomly assigned to either one of two experimental con-
ditions: easy or difficult argument generation in favor of
public transport. Because of possible gender differences in
cardiovascular activity (see Brownley et al. 2000) and the
use of public transport among students, we decided to run
this first test of our predictions only on men, who were
better accessible at the time the study was conducted. All
respondents received 5 Swiss Francs (4 USD) for
participation.
Apparatus and physiological measures
The cardiovascular measures were assessed with a com-
puter-aided monitor (Par Electronics Physioport III). SBP
(millimeters of mercury [mmHg]) and DBP (mmHg) were
determined by oscillometry. HR (beats per minute [bpm])
was determined by tabulation of oscillations in the cuff. A
blood pressure cuff was placed over the brachial artery
above the elbow of participants’ nondominant arm. The
cuff was automatically inflated and assessed values were
stored on a computer disk. One cardiovascular measure
took approximately 35 s.
Procedure
The study was described as an investigation in physio-
logical activity during task performance. Participants
attended the session individually. After having provided
informed consent, they took a seat in front of the
computer screen, and the experimenter attached the
blood pressure cuff. Experimental materials were pre-
pared such that there was no need for extraneous
movement. After the collection of biographical data (age,
major, gender), the session proceeded with an 8 min
habituation period to determine physiological baseline
values. Cardiovascular measures were repeatedly taken in
1 min intervals (i.e., 7 measures).
After the habituation period, participants in the easy
condition were asked to produce 4 different arguments in
favor of using public transport in 6 min. Participants in
the difficult condition received the same instructions, but
were asked to formulate 12 arguments. Once participants
had read the instructions and indicated that they were
ready to start, they completed the argument generation
task. During the 6 min of task performance, 6 cardio-
vascular measures were taken in intervals of 1 min,
starting at the moment of task onset. After the argument
generation task, participants answered a questionnaire
adapted from Wa¨nke et al. (1996). Specifically, partici-
pants answered the direct question ‘‘How attractive do
you consider public transportation’’ on a scale ranging
from not attractive (1) to very attractive (10), and the
indirect question ‘‘Are you in favor of more restrictions
against private vehicles?’’ on a scale ranging from no, not
at all (1) to yes, very much (10). For both measures,
higher ratings indicated a more positive attitude toward
public transportation. Participants also rated their experi-
ence during the argument generation task by responding
to two related questions. First, they indicated their diffi-
culty in generating arguments (‘‘How difficult was it to
describe the requested number of arguments?’’) on a scale
ranging from not difficult at all (1) to very difficult (10).
Second, they indicated the amount of effort they had
mobilized for argument generation (‘‘How effortful was it
to describe the requested number of arguments?’’) on a
scale ranging from not effortful at all (1) to very effortful
(10). Finally, participants were probed for suspicion,
debriefed, and received their payment.
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Results
Task performance and ratings of subjective effort
Our task manipulation was successful. Participants in the
difficult condition generated significantly more arguments
(M = 8.80, SD = 2.25) than in the easy condition
(M = 3.80, SD = 0.42), t(18) = 6.09, p \ .001, Cohen’s
d = 3.09. Given that participants’ ratings of difficulty and
invested effort were highly correlated, r(20) = .75,
p \ .001, we created a subjective effort index by averaging
the two measures. As expected, generating arguments in
favor of public transportation was rated as significantly more
effortful in the difficult condition (M = 6.90, SD = 1.42)
than in the easy condition (M = 3.80, SD = 1.49),
t(18) = 4.74, p \ .001, d = 2.13, (see Fig. 1, left panel).
Cardiovascular measures
To analyze cardiovascular reactivity we first computed
cardiovascular baseline values by taking the averages of the
last two measures of each assessed parameter, given that for
all of them, the last two measures did not differ significantly
from one another. Then, we computed cardiovascular
change (delta) scores for each participant by subtracting the
baseline values from the averages of values obtained during
task performance (see blood pressure publication guidelines
by Shapiro et al. 1996). As the SBP baselines differed
between conditions (easy: M = 116.55, SD = 5.32; diffi-
cult: M = 103.30, SD = 6.78), t(18) = 4.86, p \ .001,
d = 2.24, we conducted preliminary ANCOVAs to test for
associations between the cardiovascular baseline values and
reactivity scores (e.g., Llabre et al. 1991) in order to
determine if we needed to adjust the reactivity scores with
regard to the baseline values. These analyses found only a
trend towards a significant association between the HR
baselines and reactivity scores, F(1, 17) = 3.88, p = .07,
g2 = .19, and no significant associations between baselines
and reactivity scores for SBP and DBP (Fs [1, 17] \ 1.89,
ps [ .28, g2s \ .10). Consequently, we used non-adjusted
reactivity scores in the further analysis.
As expected, systolic reactivity was significantly stron-
ger in the difficult (M = 10.50, SD = 5.44) than in the
easy condition (M = 3.89, SD = 5.76), t(18) = 2.46,
p \ .05, d = 1.18, (see Fig. 1, middle panel). The same
effect emerged for HR reactivity (difficult: M = 9.90,
SD = 4.69; easy: M = -0.20, SD = 6.76), t(18) = 3.88,
p \ .001, d = 1.71. Note that the HR effect remained
significant, F(1, 17) = 8.67, p \ .05, g2 = .34, after con-
trolling for the HR baselines as covariate (see above). The
effect on diastolic reactivity pointed in the same direction
as those obtained on SBP and HR reactivity (difficult:
M = 7.28, SD = 5.02; easy: M = 4.71, SD = 5.37) but
failed to be significant, t(18) = 1.11, p \ .29, d = .49.
Attitude measure
Participants’ attitude about public transport in general was
favorable (M = 7.25, SD = 2.08) and more positive than
their attitude towards restrictions on private vehicles
(M = 5.75, SD = 2.59), t(18) = 2.06, p \ .05, d = .72.
This highly positive attitude suggests that it was pre-
computed and that the effort manipulation thus should have
more impact on participants’ attitude towards restrictions
on private cars, an issue our participants had more mixed
feelings about and probably had not reflected upon. Indeed,
in the difficult condition (i.e., after generating many pro-
public-transportation arguments), participants were less in
favor of restrictions against private vehicles (M = 4.60,
SD = 2.91) than in the easy condition (i.e., after generating
few pro-public-transportation arguments) (M = 6.90,
SD = 1.66), t(18) = 2.17, p \ .05, d = .97 (see Fig. 1,
right panel). This replicated the standard ‘‘effort’’ effect,
with participants’ relying on the accessibility experience
rather than the number of arguments in constructing their
judgment. The manipulation effect on the direct attitude
measure was, by contrast, not significant, Measy = 6.80,
SD = 2.20 vs. Mdifficult = 7.70, SD = 1.95, t(18) = 0.97,




















































Fig. 1 Cell means and standard errors of subjective effort during the argument generation task (left panel), systolic blood pressure reactivity
during argument generation (middle panel), and the attitude measure (right panel) in Experiment 1
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Correlation analysis
To understand how subjective effort and objective effort
related to the judgment effects we analyzed the zero-order
correlations between the variables of interest. As shown in
Table 1, the difficulty manipulation, subjective effort, SBP
reactivity as most sensitive measure of objective effort, and
the indirect attitude measure were significantly correlated.
Moreover, subjective effort was positively related to SBP,
and, as expected, negatively to the attitude about restricting
private vehicles. Although these correlations did not attain
the conventional level of significance (ps \ .21), it is of
note the correlation between systolic reactivity and attitude
was close to zero.
Discussion
Generating many, as opposed to few, arguments for public
transportation was not only subjectively experienced as
more difficult, but also elicited more objective effort in
terms of cardiovascular reactivity. These findings clearly
indicate that the ease-of-processing paradigm involves
changes in both subjective and objective effort. Further, the
indirect measure of attitude showed the standard ‘‘ease’’
effect—with participants being more favorable towards
private transportation when forced to recall more, rather
than fewer, arguments in favor of public transportation.
This finding suggests that objective effort could potentially
play a role in the ease-of-processing effects on attitudes.
However, our analysis also suggested that subjectively
experienced rather than objectively mobilized effort was
related to the attitude effect, although—most probably due
to the small sample size—the correlation between sub-
jective effort and the attitude measure did not attain the
conventional level of significance.
Experiment 2: Ease of retrieval
This experiment sought to conceptually replicate Experi-
ment 1 and to extend our investigation to another domain
of ‘‘ease’’ effects. We used a similar procedure as Schwarz
et al. (1991), who found that the ease of retrieval of
assertive episodes influences judgments of assertiveness
more than the number of retrieved instances. In addition,
we included the same measures of objectively mobilized
effort as in Experiment 1. Ease of retrieval was manipu-
lated by instructing participants to either recall few or
many instances of their past behavior. To manipulate the
valence of the recalled behavior, participants retrieved
situations in which they had acted either assertively or
unassertively. We predicted again greater subjective effort
and greater effort-related cardiovascular reactivity in the
difficult conditions than in the easy conditions. Moreover,
following Schwarz et al. (1991), we predicted that
remembering many assertive behaviors (difficult) would
result in lower assertiveness ratings than recalling few
assertive behaviors (easy), with reverse effects being
obtained when participants recall unassertive behaviors.
Method
Participants and design
Fifty-two university students with various majors were
randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (difficulty: easy
vs. difficult) 9 2 (assertiveness: assertive vs. unassertive)
between-persons design, balanced for gender. Psychology
majors in their second year or higher were excluded
because of their prior experiences with similar manipula-
tions. Later on, 4 participants had to be excluded from the
analyses because their cardiovascular measures contained
too many missing data due to technical measurement
problems. This left 48 participants (40 women, 8 men) with
an average age of 21.98 years (SD = 3.26). The study
lasted for about 30 min. Participants received course
credits for their participation.
Materials, measures, and procedure
The cardiovascular measures were collected with the same
apparatus as in Experiment 1 and the procedure was also
similar. An exception was that we assessed the cardiovas-
cular measures in 2 min intervals to prevent discomfort
that could interfere with the expected cognitive experi-
ences. Participants were told that the study investigated
memory effects on physiological responses. After collec-
tion of demographic data and attachment of the blood
pressure cuff, cardiovascular measures were assessed dur-
ing a 10 min habituation period in 2 min intervals (i.e., 5
measures) to determine cardiovascular baselines. Subse-
quently, participants received instructions to recall either 4
(easy) or 11 (difficult) situations in which they had felt
assertive (assertive condition) or unassertive (unassertive
condition) within 6 min. During the retrieval task, partici-
pants’ cardiovascular responses were recorded in 2 min
Table 1 Zero-order correlations between the difficulty manipulation,
subjective effort, SBP reactivity, and attitude in Experiment 1
Variables Subjective effort SBP reactivity Attitude
Difficulty manipulation .75*** .50* -.46*
Subjective effort .29 -.29
SBP reactivity -.02
N = 20. SBP = systolic blood pressure reactivity. * p B .05 level,
*** p B .001 (two-tailed)
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intervals (i.e., 3 measures). Adapted from Schwarz et al.
(1991), participants then judged their assertiveness (‘‘How
assertive are you?’’) on a scale ranging from not at all
assertive (0) to very assertive (10) and their unassertiveness
(‘‘How unassertive are you if you interact with others?’’)
on a scale ranging from not at all unassertive (0) to very
unassertive (10). Next, participants indicated again the
experienced difficulty of the retrieval task (not at all dif-
ficult [0] to very difficult [10]) and the effort they had
mobilized (not effortful at all [0] to very effortful [10]), to
assess subjective effort. Finally, participants were probed
for suspicion and debriefed.
Results
Given that the number of men was relatively small, we
tested with preliminary 2 (assertiveness) 9 2 (difficulty)
ANCOVAs, with gender as covariate, if gender had any
significant influence on the main dependent variables—
cardiovascular reactivity, subjective effort, and the asser-
tiveness judgments. Because these analyses found no
significant gender effects (Fs [1, 44] \ 1.56, ps [ .21,
g2 \ .04) this factor was not further considered in the
analyses reported below.
Task performance and subjective effort
The manipulation of task performance was successful. A 2
(difficulty) 9 2 (assertiveness) between-persons ANOVA
on the number of retrieved examples revealed a large dif-
ficulty main effect due to a greater number of retrieved
situations in the difficult condition (M = 8.04, SD = 2.05
vs. M = 4.00, SD = 0.00), F(1, 44) = 88.93, p \ .001,
g2 = .67, and no effect of assertiveness, Fs [1, 44] \ 1,
ps [ .92, g2 \ .01.
Given that the ratings of experienced task difficulty and
invested effort were highly correlated, r(48) = .63,
p \ .001, we averaged them to a subjective effort index. A
2 (difficulty) 9 2 (assertiveness) between-persons
ANOVA on this index revealed the expected difficulty
main effect, F(1, 44) = 21.08, p \ .001, g2 = .32, indi-
cating higher effort in the difficult (M = 5.56, SD = 2.37)
than in the easy condition (M = 3.02, SD = 1.80). Unex-
pectedly, the assertiveness main effect, F(1, 44) = 4.77,
p \ .05, g2 = .10, and the interaction were also significant,
F(1, 44) = 6.55, p \ .05, g2 = .13. Inspection of the cell
means (see Fig. 2, left panel) revealed significantly lower
demand in the easy-assertive (M = 2.92, SD = 1.58) than
in the difficult-assertive cell (M = 6.88, SD = 2.11),
t(44) = 5.06, p \ .001, d = 2.12. However, in the unas-
sertive condition, the easy (M = 3.13, SD = 2.06) and the
difficult (M = 4.25, SD = 1.87) cells did not differ reli-
ably, t(44) = 1.40, p [ .15, d = .57.
Cardiovascular measures
The last two cardiovascular measures taken during the
habituation period constituted the cardiovascular baselines.
According to 2 (difficulty) 9 2 (assertiveness) ANOVAs,
there were no significant baseline differences between the
conditions for any of the three assessed cardiovascular
indices (all Fs [1, 44] \ 1.65, ps [ .30, g2s \ .04). After
creating reactivity scores, we first tested with ANCOVAs if
the cardiovascular reactivity scores were significantly
associated with the respective baselines. Because none of
these associations were significant we conducted all further
analyses without baseline corrections.
A 2 (difficulty) 9 2 (assertiveness) ANOVA of SBP
reactivity revealed a significant interaction, F(1,
44) = 8.00, p \ .008, g2 = .15, in absence of significant
main effects (Fs \ 1.01, ps [ .31, g2 \ .03). Comparison
of cell means (see Fig. 2, middle panel) found for the
assertive condition that systolic reactivity was, as expected,
significantly stronger in the difficult condition (M = 10.50,
SD = 6.64) than in the easy condition (M = 3.61,
SD = 4.98), t(44) = 2.59, p \ .05, d = 1.17. In the
unassertive condition, however, the easy (M = 7.02,
SD = 8.48) and difficult (M = 3.29, SD = 5.35) cells did
not differ significantly, t(44) = 1.40, p [ .16, d = .52.
































































Fig. 2 Cell means and standard errors of subjective demand of the retrieval task (left panel), systolic blood pressure reactivity during retrieval
(middle panel), and assertiveness judgments (right panel) in Experiment 2
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indicates that the difficulty manipulation was only effective
in the assertive condition. The 2 (difficulty) 9 2 (asser-
tiveness) ANOVA of DBP reactivity found no significant
effects (Fs \ 1, ps [ .34, g2s \ .02). An analogous
ANOVA for HR reactivity only revealed a main effect of
assertiveness, F(1, 44) = 4.24, p \ .05, g2 = .09, indicat-
ing weaker reactivity in the unassertive condition
(M = 2.71, SD = 4.91) than in the assertive condition
(M = 7.38, SD = 9.75). No other effect approached sig-
nificance (Fs \ 1, ps [ .50, g2s \ .01).
Assertiveness judgments
We recoded the two items measuring assertiveness so that
higher scores indicated higher assertiveness, and we
assessed their correlation. As the two items correlated only
moderately, r(48) = .43, p \ .01, we analyzed them sep-
arately. In the following we will concentrate on the
assertiveness item, as there were no significant effects for
the item measuring unassertiveness in the contact with
others (Fs [1, 44] \ 1, ps [ .66, g2s \ .01).
As discussed, our recall manipulation influenced sub-
jective and objective effort in the assertive condition, but
had no effects in the unassertive condition. Similarly, the
effort manipulation only influenced the judgments in
the assertive condition. Correspondingly, participants in
the assertive condition judged their assertiveness as lower
(M = 5.08, SD = 2.23) after recalling many assertive sit-
uations (difficult), than they did after recalling fewer
assertive situations (easy) (M = 6.83, SD = 1.80),
t(44) = 2.11, p \ .05, d = .86 (see the right panel of
Fig. 2). However, in the unassertive condition, the asser-
tiveness ratings did not differ reliably between the easy
(M = 6.50, SD = 1.45) and the difficult (M = 5.50,
SD = 2.11) cells, t(22) = 1.35, p [ .20, d = .55. In
addition, there was a difficulty main effect, with partici-
pants rating themselves as generally less assertive after
listing many examples (M = 6.67, SD = 1.01 vs. M =
5.29, SD = 2.14), F(1, 44) = 6.14, p \ .02, g2 = .12. No
other effect approached significance (Fs (1, 44) \ 1,
ps [ .50, g2 \ .01).
An analysis of the zero-order correlations between the
difficulty manipulation, subjective effort, SBP reactivity,
and the assertiveness judgments in the assertive condi-
tion—where the manipulations had significant effects—
revealed similar results as Study 1 (see Table 2). The
assertiveness judgment was negatively related to subjective
effort. Unlike Study 1, the assertiveness judgment was also
negatively related to systolic reactivity. However, these
correlations suffered from the limited sample size and were
not significant (ps B .10, two-tailed). Therefore we will
report below an analysis of the combined samples of both
experiments.
Discussion
We found again that objective effort is mobilized in the
ease-of-processing paradigm. When participants listed
assertive behaviors, generating many, as opposed to few,
examples elicited greater subjective and objective effort.
Further, in the assertiveness condition, participants who
listed many examples rated their own assertiveness as
lower than participants who listed few examples. This
pattern replicates the standard ‘‘ease’’ effect in the litera-
ture (Schwarz et al. 1991). We did not obtain the standard
‘‘ease’’ pattern in the unassertive situations. However, the
results were still consistent with the theoretical assump-
tions because in this condition the task manipulation did
influence neither subjective nor objective effort.
Joint analysis
The small sample sizes of Experiment 1 and the assertive
condition of Experiment 2—where the manipulations had
significant effects—did not yield sufficient statistical power
to analyze the contributions of subjective and objective
effort to the manipulation effect. Therefore we calculated
z-scores of the measures of subjective effort, objective
effort (SBP reactivity), and participants’ judgments and
merged the data sets of Experiment 1 and the assertive
condition of Experiment 2 to obtain a sample size permit-
ting a mediation analysis (N = 44). Note that the
procedures, difficulty manipulations, and quantifications of
the dependent variables were alike in these merged
conditions.
We tested a full mediation model according to the
principles of Baron and Kenny (1986). In a first step we
tested if the difficulty manipulation had significant influ-
ences on the other three measures. This was the case for all
measures, with b = .74 for subjective effort, b = .52 for
SBP reactivity, and b = -.43 for the judgments, all
ts [ 3.09, ps \ .01. Next we tested if the two measures of
effort were also significantly related to judgments. This
was the case for subjective effort, b = -.32, t(42) =
-2.17, p \ .05, but not for objective effort, b = -.20,
t(42) = -1.31, p [ .20, indicating that objective effort had
Table 2 Zero-order correlations between the difficulty manipulation,
subjective effort, SBP reactivity, and the assertiveness judgments in
the assertive condition of Experiment 2
Variables Subjective effort SBP reactivity Judgment
Difficulty manipulation .74*** .52** -.41*
Subjective effort .49* -.34+
SBP reactivity -.35+
N = 24. SBP = systolic blood pressure reactivity
+ p B .10; * p B .05 level; ** p B .01; *** p B .001 (two-tailed)
Motiv Emot (2008) 32:1–10 7
123
no significant influence on the judgment effects. In sum-
mary this shows that the manipulation had significant
effects on both objective and subjective effort, but that
objective effort did not contribute to the judgment effects.
We further explored the significant effect of subjective
effort by analyzing how much of the manipulation effect on
judgments can be explained by changes in subjective effort.
To this end we conducted a regression analysis simulta-
neously entering the difficulty manipulation and subjective
effort. This analysis revealed that the difficulty manipula-
tion effect remained unchanged, b = -.43, p \ .05, after
including subjective effort into the regression and that
subjective effort had no additional effect, b = .01, p [ .97.
We return to this finding in the discussion.
However, it is of note that our primary research question
was if subjective effort or SBP reactivity contributed more
to the judgment effects. Given the low statistical power for a
full mediation model due to the limited sample size, we thus
ran another analysis focusing on the relative contributions
of subjective and objective effort, which were both signif-
icantly related to the difficulty manipulation. As presented
in Fig. 3, subjective effort was positively related to SBP
reactivity, b = .40, t(42) = 2.83, p \ .01. As already
reported above, only the negative relationships between the
judgments and subjective effort were significant (p \ .05),
while the relationship between objective effort and judg-
ments was not (p [ .20), already suggesting that objective
effort played only a minor role in the ease effect on judg-
ments. Most relevant, however, is that the negative path from
subjective effort to the judgments remained intact when SBP
reactivity was simultaneously entered into the regression,
b = -.28, t(41) = 1.76, p \ .05 (one-tailed), while the
relation between SBP reactivity and the judgments became
even weaker, b = -.09, t(41) = 0.52, p [ .50. This indi-
cates that subjective effort has a relatively greater effect on
judgments in the ease-of-processing paradigm while objec-
tive effort has little or no effect on these judgments.
General discussion
The present experiments examined the role of objective
effort in the ‘‘ease-of-retrieval’’ and ‘‘ease-of-argument-
generation’’ paradigms (Schwarz 1998). In two experiments
we found that subjective effort (measured via self-ratings)
and objective effort (measured via cardiovascular reactiv-
ity) were higher when participants generated many (vs. few)
arguments or instances of behavior. These findings suggest
that the standard manipulations used in ‘‘ease paradigms’’
involve both subjective effort and objective effort. The fact
that the ease paradigm does indeed seem to elicit genuine
effort mobilization resonates with a large literature showing
that effort in cognitive tasks can be tracked with psycho-
physiological measures (see Gendolla and Brinkmann
2005; Wright and Kirby 2001 for reviews).
As in previous research, participants’ attitudes and
judgments were influenced in a paradoxical way by the
ease-of-processing manipulation (see Schwarz and Clore
2006, for a review). In Experiment 1, participants were
more favorable towards private vehicles after generating
many favorable arguments for public transport. In Experi-
ment 2, participants evaluated themselves as less assertive
after retrieving many assertive behaviors. This suggests
that the implications of ‘‘what’’ (available content: how
much information comes to mind) can be overridden by the
experience of ‘‘how’’ (available experience: how that
information comes to mind).
We also examined the respective contributions of sub-
jective and objective effort to the judgment effects. A joint
analysis of both experiments suggested that objective
effort, even though it was elicited by the manipulation, had
no influence on judgment. Moreover, controlling for
objective effort did not change the impact of subjective
effort on judgment, suggesting that in the ease-of-pro-
cessing paradigm, if anything, subjective but not objective
effort has an effect on judgment formation. This is an
interesting result, given the findings of Stepper and Strack
(1993) on the importance of bodily feedback or the results
by Reber et al. (2004) showing that manipulations of
objective difficulty can sometimes influence judgments
without changing subjective effort.
Even though subjective effort had a significant impact
on judgment, our analysis also showed that it could not
explain variance in judgment over and above the manipu-
lation in the full mediation model. This raises the question
of how important the subjective perception of effort is for
the judgmental ‘‘ease’’ effects. Several considerations bear
on this issue. First, the link between subjective effort and
the judgment effects in the literature is reasonably well-
established. However, this conclusion is primarily based on
the results of misattribution studies which eliminate the









Fig. 3 Mediation analysis based on the merged samples of Exper-
iment 1 and the assertive condition of Experiment 2 (N = 44). Path-
coefficients without parentheses give beta weights of a regression
analysis including both subjective and objective effort as predictors
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undermined (for a review see Schwarz and Clore 2006).
Interestingly, most ease-of-processing studies do not report
mediation analyses and merely restrict themselves to
reports of simple correlations (e.g., Aarts and Dijksterhuis
1999; Schwarz et al. 1991; Wa¨nke et al. 1996; Norbert
Schwarz, personal communication). Assuming this link,
the nonsignificant mediation effect could be due to a lack
of power because of the small sample size and to the
additional noise caused by the somewhat more invasive
measurement of physiological responses. Second, it is also
possible that the difficulty manipulation may also have
affected the judgments via other variables that we did not
control. In fact, there is growing evidence that subjectively
experienced effort is only one of many variables that can
influence judgments in the ‘‘ease-of-retrieval paradigm’’.
Thus, literature shows that judgment effects in this para-
digm are influenced by variables such as imagined effort
(Wa¨nke et al. 1997), the difference between expected and
experienced effort (Raghubir and Menon 2005; Hansen and
Wa¨nke in press), or confidence in the information con-
veyed by one’s own thoughts (Tormala et al. 2002).
Examining the role of these variables may help understand
why the mediation from the manipulation to the judgment
effects via subjective effort was not significant in the full
mediation model.
Our studies also yielded some unexpected results. In the
unassertiveness condition of Experiment 2, the ‘‘few-ver-
sus-many’’ manipulation did not influence subjective nor
objective effort and, correspondingly, had no effect on
judgments. One possible explanation for this finding is that
effort will only be mobilized in proportion to task difficulty
as long as success is possible and justifies the effort, and that
disengagement occurs if a task appears to be too difficult or
if success is not worth the necessary effort (Brehm and Self
1989; Wright 1996). In this condition of Experiment 2, the
unpleasantness of listing many unassertive behaviors could
have induced disengagement because of an additive effect
on experienced demand due to negative affect (induced by
the retrieval of unassertive behaviors) and high task diffi-
culty (see Gendolla and Brinkmann 2005). If so, this would
suggest an interesting boundary condition on the ease-of-
retrieval effect. In fact, other studies also found effects of
negative information to be weaker than those of positive
information (e.g., Wa¨nke et al. 1996).
Another point that deserves some discussion is that there
were significant difficulty effects on both SBP and HR in
Experiment 1, whereas Experiment 2 only found an effect on
SBP. However, as mentioned in the introduction, it is a
common finding that HR responds less reliably to task
demand than SBP, most likely because HR is both sympa-
thetically and parasympathetically mediated, while SBP is
sympathetically mediated and systematically related to
myocardial constriction (Brownley et al. 2000; Obrist 1981;
Wright 1996). Thus, SBP is the more sensitive measure of
task engagement (see also Gendolla and Richter 2005,
2006).
Conclusion and outlook
The present studies showed for the first time that the classic
‘‘ease-of-processing’’ paradigm involves not only changes
in subjective effort, but also objective effort, as assessed by
psychophysiological measures. Our analyses suggested that
subjective effort is significantly related to judgments,
although its role in mediating the impact of the few/many
manipulation is less clear. More importantly, our analyses
showed that objective effort had a negligible effect on
judgments. However, our first attempt to measure objective
effort with cardiovascular measures may be complemented
with investigations of other physiological contributors to
effort experience such as feedback from the muscular,
hormonal, and somatosensory systems (e.g., Craig 2002).
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